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Introduction
The governance of global food and agriculture is being
transformed as the food system has become more global-
ized and as corporate control of that system has become
more concentrated. Traditionally the domain of govern-
mental and intergovernmental actors, the governance of
food and agriculture is increasingly becoming not just
influenced, but also ‘‘created’’ by corporate actors via
private governance mechanisms. These mechanisms
include industry-set quality and safety standards, private
codes of conduct, and corporate social responsibility (CSR)
initiatives. While the literature has paid considerable
attention to the globalization of the agrifood system more
broadly (Bonanno et al. 1994) and has begun to look at the
role of corporations in the system (Clapp and Fuchs 2009),
empirical research on private governance mechanisms in
global food and agriculture governance is only just starting
to emerge. We still require considerably more insight on
the nature of the private governance mechanisms and their
impact on fundamental values and core objectives of food
governance.
The rise of private governance mechanisms in the
agrifood system poses challenges for several fundamental
values and core objectives of food governance. In partic-
ular, the privatization of key aspects of the agrifood gov-
ernance system raises questions about their ability to
uphold democratic legitimacy and to promote sustainabil-
ity. How do democratic ideals fit with private actors gen-
erating rules and regulations that transcend national
borders moving to spaces previously occupied by states
(Schaller 2007)?1 After all, the private actors creating these
mechanisms used to be considered (mainly) objects rather
than subjects of governance, whose activities needed to be
regulated in the interest of society. Yet, it is these actors
who create and implement rules and standards today and
thereby strongly influence the sustainability of the global
agrifood system.
The sustainability of the global agrifood system, in turn,
is an essential precondition for the well-being of societies
world-wide. Both social and environmental aspects of
sustainability need to be considered. Food security and
food safety need to be provided for individuals to be able to
sustain healthy and productive lives. At this point in time,
neither food security nor food safety is fully ensured. Over
one billion people suffer from hunger and 6 million people
die from malnutrition and contaminated food and water
every year (FAO 2009). Moreover, millions of small
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farmers across the globe, and especially in developing
countries, depend on food production for their well-being.
This dynamic is also significant from a gender perspective,
as in most developing countries women are responsible for
60–80% of food production. Similarly, they are still the
primary ones responsible for food preparation in most
countries and cultures around the world. Environmental
dimensions are also important for sustainability, as food
production is intimately tied to the issues of soil, water,
biodiversity and emissions among other things.
What then are the implications of private food gover-
nance for the democratic legitimacy of global agrifood
governance and the sustainability of the global agrifood
system? With respect to democratic legitimacy, one could
argue that private agrifood governance simply mobilizes
additional resources in the pursuit of public objectives in
times and cases in which states either cannot or will not
commit to public governance due to the limits of their
jurisdiction, a lack of resources, or conflicting interests.
With respect to sustainability, private food governance
mechanisms may help ensure the safety and quality of food
products as well as foster improvements for the environ-
mental and social conditions of the food system, as they
tend to state in their objectives.
However, as several critical scholars have noted, the
knowledge we actually have about these private gover-
nance institutions and their impact, especially in develop-
ing countries, is very limited (Blowfield 2005, 2007;
Margolis and Welsh 2003). Much of the knowledge we
have is based on a few case studies and corporate self-
reporting. Moreover, both theoretical and empirical studies
point to the potential drawbacks of private governance
institutions for the democratic legitimacy of global agri-
food governance and the sustainability of the global agri-
food system. Thus, scholars draw our attention to the
danger that private institutions may circumvent or under-
mine public national and international law (Haufler 1999;
O’Rourke 2003). They highlight the potentially pre-emp-
tive character of private standards, which allows companies
to avoid harder and more binding state regulation with
respect to social or environmental objectives, and voice
concerns regarding the lack of effective monitoring (Fuchs
2007; Greven 2004).
Interestingly, the questions raised above have so far
received little systematic attention in scientific debate.
Empirical research on the impacts of private governance on
the democratic legitimacy of global agrifood governance
and the sustainability of the global agrifood system is just
starting to emerge. This is particularly noteworthy, as pri-
vate governance mechanisms have expanded dramatically
in global agrifood governance and now exist in a vast
variety of forms and with a range of foci in almost all
spheres of the global agrifood system.
This symposium on Global Private Agrifood Gover-
nance therefore explores the nature and implications of
private agrifood institutions for fundamental values and
core objectives of food governance, in particular demo-
cratic legitimacy and sustainability. It does so by gathering
a group of articles on private agrifood institutions with a
diversity of empirical foci, thereby providing a broad view
of private agrifood governance at different levels and
regions. The articles by Catia Gregoratti and Anne Tal-
lontire examine public-private partnerships and self-regu-
lation respectively in sub-Saharan Africa, while the article
by Doris Fuchs, Agni Kalfagianni, and Tetty Havinga
focuses on retail food governance. Then, Lena Partzsch
evaluates the legitimacy of private food governance in the
cases of the biofuel industry, while Christopher Kaan and
Andrea Liese discuss public-private partnerships in global
food governance. Martha McMahon, in turn, analyzes the
fate of Canadian women farmers between private and
public regulation, before Lawrence Busch returns the
argument to a broader level and inquires into the under-
lying causes and ethical consequences of current trends in
private food governance. Finally, Spencer Henson provides
a commentary on the group of articles gathered in this
symposium and their assessment of the nature and impli-
cations of private agrifood governance. With this range of
empirical foci and the implications of private institutions
for fundamental norms and values in global agrifood
governance as a common core analytical objective, the
seven papers and commentary aim to produce a basis for
the systematic study of the private agrifood governance. As
such, this symposium hopes to contribute theoretical and
empirical insights on new important developments in pri-
vate food governance and their implications and thus fill a
significant gap in the literature.
The theme for this symposium emerged from a confer-
ence on Private Food Governance organized in Münster,
Germany. At this conference, scholars from a variety of
disciplines and countries as well as representatives of
major international organizations in the food sector, such as
FAO, discussed the impact of business-led food gover-
nance institutions on the fundamental norms and values of
global agrifood governance. The key issue addressed by the
conference and in consequence this symposium is the
democratic legitimacy of private agrifood governance.
The articles gathered here address this issue in terms of the
dimensions of participation, transparency, and account-
ability at different governance levels (see also Porter and
Ronit 2010). Moreover, they link their findings on demo-
cratic standards and legitimating mechanisms of private
agrifood governance to sustainability. Thereby, they pro-
vide insight on what private food governance can and
cannot achieve. Finally, the articles also address a range of
additional analytical issues, such as the normative origin of
336 D. Fuchs et al.
123
the rise of private agrifood governance, the public-private
interface, gender relationships, and activities of resistance.
The common analytical thread of all articles, however, is
their focus on private governance mechanisms, and their
attention to democratic legitimacy and, at least indirectly,
sustainability. After a short overview on the rise of private
agrifood governance, we explain each in some detail
below.
Private mechanisms in global agrifood governance
Today’s global food governance is characterized by an
increasing role taken by private governance structures and
institutions (FAO 2006). These private governance mech-
anisms claim to ensure the safety and quality of food
products as well as to improve environmental and social
conditions of the food system. There is a range of private
governance mechanisms in the food sector, including cor-
porate social responsibility initiatives, codes of conduct,
and private standards. These are sometimes developed and
operated in the context of public-private and private-pri-
vate partnerships, with corporate actors cooperating with
other actors, including the state and non-governmental
organizations (see Gregoratti and Kaan and Liese in this
symposium). Some initiatives are wholly developed by
corporate actors and can be seen as private, industry-led
standards (see Fuchs et al., Tallontire, Partzsch, and
McMahon in this symposium).
Corporate Social Responsibility efforts include mea-
sures to raise corporate awareness as well as reports of
business activities which touch on social, human rights,
and environmental themes. The idea is that such reporting
will foster transparency and ultimately improve firms’
performance on these fronts (Gupta 2008). Firms hope to
benefit economically from reporting, as it enhances their
reputation amongst consumers as well as investors. Firms
may undertake reporting on their own terms, or in accor-
dance with the guidelines for such reports as set out by the
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). The GRI, established in
2000, is a set of guidelines that seeks to standardize CSR
reports across firms to ensure completeness and compara-
bility, and firms that adhere to these guidelines can be
certified as having followed these guidelines. There are at
present around 1,000 firms that report in accordance with
the GRI, and a number of these firms are in the food and
agriculture sector. These include firms at the agricultural
input end of the spectrum, as well as those in the pro-
cessing and retail ends of the global food and agriculture
industry.2 Although a number of firms in the agro-food
industry utilize these guidelines, there are some notable
absences, such as Wal-Mart, which follow their own
format.
Codes of conduct can be understood as written guide-
lines on the basis of which companies deal with their
workforce, suppliers, state authorities and external stake-
holders in their host country (Greven 2004). Such codes are
not necessarily ‘‘certifiable,’’ though in some instances they
can be. Some codes are specific to the food and agriculture
sector. Some producers, such as Chiquita, have codes that
deal with labor rights. In the agricultural input industry, for
example, codes on the safe use of pesticides and on the safe
handling of genetically modified organisms exist or are
currently being developed (see Clapp 2008). One of the
more general codes is the Global Compact of the United
Nations, which was established in 1999 and which calls on
participating firms to adhere to 10 key principles for good
corporate behavior, including social and environmental
considerations. There are some 4,000 firms as participants
in the Global Compact, including a number of firms in the
food and agricultural sector––from the input sector to the
retail sector.3
Private standard-setting is a form of private governance
that has mushroomed in recent years in the food sector,
particularly in the retail sector. Private standards set out
specific principles and criteria for quality, environmental,
social or ethical characteristics of products and processes,
which frequently cover more than one stage of the supply
chain. Private standards tend to be voluntary in nature and
rely on various sorts of certification mechanisms to identify
actors complying with the principles defined in the stan-
dard (see below, however, for the limits to the voluntari-
ness of the standards). As certification, in turn, can be
defined as condition for access by later actors in the supply
chain, private standards play a market structuring role.4
Private standards are distinguished as product and pro-
cess standards. Product standards refer to various charac-
teristics embodied in the product itself, for instance quality
or safety. Process standards refer to the methods by which
the product was made (or in the case of food items, grown).
Process standards specify the characteristics that the pro-
cesses are expected to have, either to produce products
with specific attributes (e.g., organic, safe) or to create and
maintain certain conditions for the environment, workers
and other stakeholders (Reardon et al. 2001). Standards
cover a variety of issues at all levels of the food chain,
ranging from food safety and quality to environmental
management and workers’ rights. Examples of private
2 The GRI is at present developing a sector specific set of guidelines
for the food processing sector (see http://www.globalreporting.org).
3 For more information, see http://www.unglobalcompact.org.
4 Corporate social responsibility and codes of conduct exercise an
influence on the market as well, although in a less direct and
comprehensive manner.
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standards in the food chain include the Global Food Safety
Initiative, GlobalGap, International Food Standard and
Ethical Trading Initiative (see Fuchs et al. and Tallontire in
this symposium).
A number of trends have led to the dramatic expansion
in private standards. As will be apparent in articles gath-
ered in this symposium, the over-arching context of neo-
liberalism, with its emphasis on privatization, deregulation
and the reliance on market mechanisms, have created a
political space for private actors and attributed particular
value to their knowledge and interests (see Busch in this
symposium in particular). In addition and in conjunction
with this development, the global agrifood system has
witnessed an increasing level of capital concentration at the
various stages of the supply chain. This capital concen-
tration has led in recent years to the establishment of an
oligopoly at the retail end of the supply chain, which has
given the expansion in private governance additional
impetus (Burch and Lawrence 2005; Konefal et al. 2005).
These larger trends have been supported by the develop-
ment of new technologies of supply-chain management
which allowed for the corporate control of the product
chain from farm to fork, as well as competition among
firms that is based not only on price but also on quality. As
a result of these processes, private rules and standards play
a pivotal role in agrifood governance today.
With these private governance mechanisms, then, busi-
ness actors increasingly are involved in the design,
implementation and enforcement of rules and principles
governing the global food system at various points in the
sector from inputs to production to retail. As was men-
tioned earlier, however, there is little systematic knowledge
on the implications of this development and concerns have
arisen about potentially negative impacts on the democratic
legitimacy of global agrifood governance and the sustain-
ability of the global agrifood system. With respect to CSR
reporting on the part of food industry actors, for instance,
there is concern that because the reporting is itself volun-
tary, there are few sanctions against firms that engage in
practices that may lead to environmental or social harm.
For example, a firm that engages in unsustainable activities
may fail to report, or may report only partial information,
or may fully disclose problems that have emerged. The
same is the case for codes of conduct. Firms that flout the
principles of the Global Compact, for example, face only
minimal consequences. In any of these cases, there is no
external mechanism to hold firms accountable (Clapp
2008).
Likewise, private standards frequently address only
selective aspects of sustainability (Fuchs et al. 2009).
Moreover, their structural power provides an important
additional source of concern. These ‘‘voluntary’’ standards,
though set privately, in a way ‘‘govern’’ the market, in that
firms will want to adhere to them, because being certified is
crucial to maintaining market access. This, in turn, means
that despite the de jure voluntary character of private
standards, they become de facto compulsory especially for
the supply side (Blowfield 2005). Indeed, many of the
private standards and initiatives in the food sector are
developed collectively by corporate actors, thus limiting
suppliers’ market choices; in other words, the latter simply
have to accept them (Busch 2000).
The pivotal role of private institutions in today’s global
food governance raises questions about their implications
for the nature of the global agrifood system, specifically the
balance between public and private interests. In fact, fun-
damental objectives of agrifood governance, in particular
food safety but also the environmental and social sustain-
ability of the agrifood system, are increasingly part of
companies’ CSR initiatives, codes of conduct, or private
standards. The pursuit of private economic interests does
not necessarily run counter to the pursuit of the public
interest, of course. At the same time, there is no guarantee
that the pursuit of private economic interests fosters the
public interest. In consequence, one has to ask what private
governance means for public objectives in global agrifood
governance.
Private food governance and democratic legitimacy
As noted above, increasing privatization of food gover-
nance has raised questions about democratic legitimacy.
Clearly, many developments in the global agrifood systems
are transnational and difficult for nation states alone to
control today (Van Waarden 2008). For example, con-
taminated food may spread quickly and be difficult to trace.
Yet, private rules created among members of a ‘‘club,’’ but
affecting myriads of people in a multitude of locations,
raise critical questions about people’s autonomy under law,
the fundamental principle of democracy. Due to the pivotal
role of corporate actors in global agrifood governance
today, but also their ambivalent implications for the sus-
tainability of the global food system, there is a need to tie
their activities to some notion of democracy.
Obviously any attempt to do so with traditional notions
of democracy will fail as fundamental democracy
requirements are violated. Private actors are not elected.
Yet, food safety and quality, and environmental and social
sustainability, are public goods, and the practices followed
by corporations in the food sector affect the lives of mil-
lions of people. Scholars propose, then, different indicators
for the examination of democratic forms of governance
beyond the state.
In this symposium, the contributors emphasize the cri-
teria of participation, transparency and accountability,
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which have become the core tools for evaluations of the
legitimacy of private governance in the literature (Porter
and Ronit 2010; Schaller 2007). These criteria are uni-
versally accepted democratic values and have been
employed to evaluate and improve the legitimacy of private
and public governance at the national level. The novelty as
well as challenge here is both the private nature of the
governance institutions considered as well as their global
dimension, which in turn increases the diversity of publics
affected and associated complexity of impacts.
From a democratic perspective, participation should
include all the actors who are potentially affected in order
to ensure their autonomy under law or elected representa-
tion. In global food governance this implies the identifi-
cation of a functionally defined demos sharing a common
fate and affected by the same threats, rather than one based
on territory (Van Waarden 2008). Autonomy presupposes
equality as it is difficult to imagine freedom under law if it
is not equally possible for all to participate in the positing
of the law (Castoriadis 1997). Thus, participation is defined
in terms of access of all relevant actors in the development
of standards and equality among the actors in the decision-
making procedures.
Transparency is a fundamental condition for the demo-
cratic legitimacy of private governance mechanisms too
(Gupta 2008). If private actors develop their own rules, then
at least the procedures for developing such rules should be
open to public scrutiny. A lack of transparency can render
access meaningless, even in cases where it exists, by
obscuring the real options for which actors can ‘‘vote’’
(Fuchs and Kalfagianni 2010a). Transparency is not given,
furthermore, if scrutiny refers to technical aspects of food
production only while socially relevant aspects are left out.
Moreover, a lack of transparency further restricts control
possibilities which are already minimal as global political
processes become more complex and it is difficult to deter-
mine who is responsible. One has to acknowledge, of course,
that transparency for private entities is problematic to the
extent that we expect private entities to keep certain infor-
mation private. What is in dispute is which information can
be kept private and which should be kept public.
Next to questions of participation and transparency,
finally, accountability is a crucial issue when it comes to
democratic governance (Clapp and Utting 2008).
Accountability can be distinguished in its internal and
external dimensions. Internal accountability needs to be
provided towards the stakeholders participating in the
ownership of the standards and initiatives through mecha-
nisms such as reporting and peer control. External
accountability needs to be provided towards the affected
public. Here, the role of auditing third-party organizations,
for instance, has been proposed as a mechanism of pro-
viding external accountability (Furger 1997). The extent to
which third-party auditing can provide for external
accountability, however, is controversial (see below).
Next to participation, transparency, and accountability,
output legitimacy has been proposed as a criterion of
democratic legitimacy (Bäckstrand 2006; Scharpf 1998).
Output legitimacy presupposes that the effectiveness in
achieving a given objective can serve as a source of
legitimacy. However, it is extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to measure effectiveness in the absence of
participation and transparency (Fuchs and Kalfagianni
2010a). Different stakeholders will define different aspects
of the global food system as objectives for agrifood gov-
ernance. Thus, representatives of corporations and of
environmental or development NGOs, for example, raise
different demands towards private standards in general and
therefore identify different benchmarks for measuring their
effectiveness. In consequence, there is no objective mea-
sure of the ‘‘effectiveness’’ of a private governance insti-
tution. At the same time, measuring the effectiveness of a
private governance institution simply against its self-set
objectives does not provide a solution either. After all,
these objectives may be set at such low levels, for instance,
that the achievement of these objectives could not possibly
be seen as a source of legitimacy. In consequence, output
legitimacy cannot serve as a useful tool in assessments of
the legitimacy of private governance institutions in general
and private agrifood governance institutions in particular.
When applying the criteria of participation, transparency
and accountability to the cases of private agrifood gover-
nance studied in this symposium, then, we find the fol-
lowing. Presently, substantial asymmetries in access and
participation prevent the creation of equal opportunities for
different societal actors to influence private food gover-
nance institutions. Many cases of the private food gover-
nance institutions analyzed show that the participation of
major stakeholders has been lacking or is constrained by
highly unsatisfactory institutional frameworks (see Fuchs
et al., Partzsch, and Gregoratti in this symposium). Thus,
questions need to be asked about who is invited to partic-
ipate, as well as how and who actually is represented in the
decision making bodies of private food governance. In the
biofuels industry, for instance, Southern actors are regu-
larly excluded from governance processes (Partzsch in this
symposium). Likewise, the Growing Sustainable Business
Initiative of the United Nations Development Program
failed to include Kenya’s smallholders, who were supposed
to be its beneficiaries (Gregoratti in this symposium).
Similar to the issue of participation, the question of
transparency provides a serious challenge to the democratic
legitimacy of private food governance, as the various
studies show. Private rules and standards are rarely open to
public scrutiny. In other words, private governance insti-
tutions frequently fail to provide information about
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international governance structures and processes (Fuchs
et al. in this symposium). This is related to the frequent
exclusion of civil society in the monitoring and imple-
mentation of standards. Such a constrained transparency
can render access, even where it exists, meaningless. At the
same time, the growing differentiation of food standards
resulting from multiple ways of certification is creating an
extremely difficult situation for market participants (Busch
in this symposium).
Finally, accountability is only provided in a limited
sense in most of the cases analyzed as well. While internal
and external accountability in a narrow sense tend to exist
in some form, the actors creating the private governance
institutions are at best accountable to a very small share of
the people affected by their activities. Both transparency
and accountability tend to suffer from the problems created
by the asymmetries in participation, as the cases studies
show. Yet, these asymmetries in participation are difficult
to remedy. After all, the resources of farmers from the
South or even ‘‘large’’ civil society organizations from the
North are severely limited relative to the resources of
business actors. In consequence, efforts to help these dis-
advantaged groups to play a more active role will require
substantial financial and organizational support.
The sustainability of private food governance
We understand sustainability to cover the issues of food
security and food safety, as well as environmental and
social aspects of food governance. More specifically, we
consider food security and food safety fundamental aspects
for the ability of populations to live healthy, productive and
happy lives. Food insecurity, in particular, remains a
problem for millions of people while its range and conse-
quences have been aggravated by the recent food crisis.
More specifically, soaring food prices in 2007 and 2008
worsened the prevalence of food insecurity and malnutri-
tion among the poor by reducing the quantity and quality of
food consumed, especially in the developing world (Clapp
2009). FAO estimates that, today, world hunger is
increasing with the number of hungry people passing 1
billion by 2009, an increase of over 100 million in 2008
alone (FAO 2009).
Previous research has indicated that private food gov-
ernance has ambivalent effects. Thus, some studies have
argued that private certification schemes threaten to push
small farmers out of the market in favor of large agri-
business and food processors (FAO 2006, 2008; Fuchs
et al. 2009; Hatanaka et al. 2005). Others have shown that
private food governance can help to improve food safety
through the establishment of traceability mechanisms, even
though such efforts fail to provide security against food
crises and health scares. Some studies have highlighted that
social provisions, such as worker welfare but also gender
non-discrimination and rules against sexual harassment, are
much more rarely included in private food governance.
Where they are included, they have only limited coverage
and play a secondary role in relation to food safety stan-
dards (Barrientos et al. 2001; Dolan 2005, Fuchs and
Kalfagianni 2010b). Finally, research has documented that
private governance addresses certain environmental issues,
through a focus on eco-efficiency or recycling programs,
while pointing out the selective and limited nature of the
measures at the same time. Thus, important aspects such as
biodiversity are not included (Bebbington 2001; Springett
2003; Clapp 2008).
Clearly then, there is a need for systematic analysis of
the impact of private food governance on sustainability
(FAO 2006). Thus, it is desirable to scrutinize the articles
in this symposium for information on the implications of
private governance institutions on sustainability. Again,
such an investigation supports earlier research in demon-
strating that private food governance has ambivalent
effects on the sustainability of the global agrifood system.
Specifically, private food governance is likely to address
only selected sustainability issues. The criterion for selec-
tion, in turn, appears to be consumer interests and the
corresponding marketability, or opportunities for business
profit in more general terms. In consequence, many gov-
ernance initiatives address issues like product quality and
safety, while broader issues, such as farmer livelihoods or
the right to food, are neglected (see Fuchs et al., Partzsch,
Tallontire, and Liese and Kaan in this symposium). In fact,
these issues do conflict in current practice. The objectives
of food safety and product quality mean that traceability
schemes, which are associated with substantial costs for
producers in terms of documentation and transparency
requirements, play a pivotal role in global food gover-
nance. For small farmers, these costs are difficult to bear
and carry the risk that these farmers will be pushed out of
the market and forced into subsistence farming and hun-
ger.5 One of the major shortcomings of private food gov-
ernance in terms of sustainability, then, appears to be its
effect on rural livelihoods, as food safety concerns overrule
food security interests, and corporations pass economic risk
as well as implementation costs along to the weaker actors
at the beginning of the supply chain (Fuchs et al., and
Tallontire in this symposium). This situation can be linked
to the question of participation in the creation of private
governance institutions discussed above.
5 Similarly, small farmers suffer from the power asymmetries in
public-private partnerships, as participating corporations may simply
replace them with other small farmers where economically beneficial
(see Gregoratti in this symposium).
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These findings do not mean that private governance
cannot be made to work for small farmers, too. However, a
better integration of social criteria and local knowledge and
practice in private governance institutions as well as
financial and organizational assistance by corporations,
IGOs, or NGOs is required for small farmers to benefit
from the market opportunities that private food governance
can provide. Such improvements in private food gover-
nance, then, would allow the simultaneous pursuit of a
macroeconomic competitiveness agenda and poverty alle-
viation. However, for this potential to be fulfilled, partici-
pation conditions in private governance mechanisms would
need to change.
There is also an alternative to the integration of small
farmers into a market ruled by private governance institu-
tions. Thus, some farmer collectives and NGOs emphasize
the maintenance and development of structures and net-
works allowing small farmers to successfully work outside
of private standards. Organizations of small scale women
farmers on Vancouver Island, for instance, have established
their markets independent of large retail corporations and
the standards prescribed by them (McMahon in this
symposium).6
In sum, the limited coverage of private standards when it
comes to sustainability objectives has to be seen as a major
problem. While private governance institutions may pro-
vide some solutions to narrow and clearly defined sus-
tainability problems and issues, they fail to provide
improvements and, in fact, can worsen the situation with
respect to broader issues such as rural welfare, biodiversity,
or the general fight against hunger.
Conclusions
This guest-edited symposium on Private Agrifood Gover-
nance explores the implications of the dramatic expansion
in private governance institutions in different areas and
sectors of the global agrifood system. A particular focus in
this endeavor is on the implications for democratic legiti-
macy and, to a lesser extent, on sustainable development
and the interaction between them. With respect to demo-
cratic legitimacy, the articles address issues such as par-
ticipation, transparency, and accountability with respect to
a variety of private governance institutions and at different
levels of governance. With respect to sustainability, the
articles depict the impact of private governance on aspects
ranging from narrowly defined food safety to broader
issues such as biodiversity and rural welfare. In addition,
the articles offer a number of further analytical insights.
Some of them emphasize the relationship of private food
governance to neoliberal norms and ideas, which have
allowed market-led initiatives to play a pivotal role in
addressing food governance failures. Others explore the
public-private interface noting that public actors are neither
necessarily better guardians of the public interest nor more
sensitive to sustainability objectives. Still others examine
gender relationships and activities of resistance. An addi-
tional insight offered is the inquiry into the ethical impli-
cations and underlying causes of current trends in food
governance. The critical evaluation of most articles
regarding the legitimacy and outcomes of private mecha-
nisms sparks a dynamic debate on the limits and virtues of
private food governance.
The symposium aims to fill a significant gap to the study
of private food governance. Now that the general trend of
expanding private food governance has been identified,
there is more room for empirical investigation. Thus, it
appears particularly apt to follow up on earlier research
with work that (a) explores the empirical details through
more specific case studies and (b) now turns to look very
pointedly and systematically at the implications for legiti-
macy and sustainability across a range of cases. Thereby,
the symposium aims to respond to the need for more
methodical and comprehensive analysis of the role of pri-
vate agrifood governance institutions and their broader
political and societal impact.
The findings of the symposium have given support to a
rather critical view on these newly emerging governance
methods. In this view, the question of the democratic
legitimacy of private governance is crucial, since its
implications for sustainability are ambivalent at best. The
profound negative impacts of unsustainable global food
production processes are unlikely to be resolved by private
governance institutions alone. In fact, the symposium has
highlighted that some of these governance institutions
actually worsen an already highly unsatisfactory situation.
How does the role of private agrifood governance relate
to the recent food crisis, then? Clearly, private agrifood
governance is neither the only structural cause nor even the
prime impetus behind this crisis. Decades of agricultural
subsidies and closed markets in the North as well as a
neglect of agricultural investment in developing countries,
for instance, had already put enormous strain on small
farmers in the South. Likewise, bad harvests and corre-
spondingly low stocks of wheat and rice, rising crude oil
prices, the expansion in biofuel production, and financial
speculation in agricultural futures contributed heavily to
the dramatic increase in food prices in the short run. Still,
one can recognize that private agrifood governance furthers
the marginalization of small farmers and destruction of
6 The same case shows as well, however, how the interaction
between public and private regulation can have a negative effect, as
public meat inspection standards shaped by private lobbies in this
case impose costs on the farmers and force them out of business.
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family farming in the South, thus not alleviating but
worsening the effects of the crisis.
This observation reestablishes the link to the role of
public agrifood governance, which, after all, has problems
with respect to its democratic legitimacy and impact on
sustainability as well. From the perspective of Southern
producers, standards set by the EU or the US are likely not
to carry any more democratic legitimacy than private food
standards. Still, in the end those standards were adopted by
elected governments. More importantly, they did not claim
to ensure sustainable development in the broad sense. To
the extent that private governance claims to pursue this
objective successfully, however, it may preempt future
public efforts. Clearly, however, the cases of the US and
EU agricultural trade politics just like the public hygiene
standards in Canada mentioned above show that public
governance can be just as problematic as private gover-
nance, especially if it ends up being public governance in
the private interest.
Thus, this symposium does not aim to highlight the
pitfalls of private agrifood governance against the back-
ground of an assumption of the perfect nature of public
agrifood governance. Rather, it analyzes the implications
of private food governance due to the vast expansion in its
extent and reach in the last decade. It is due to this
expansion that we urgently need to know what its strengths
and weaknesses are and how the latter can be reduced.
Where do we go from here then? The articles gathered
in this symposium indicate a number of interesting topics
and approaches for further research. They point to the
potentially interesting insights to be gained from studies
that reduce the actor-centeredness in the focus and look at
processes when assessing private agrifood governance.
After all, the setting in which private governance institu-
tions exist is not passive and fixed. Instead private gover-
nance institutions have to be seen as dynamic processes
continuously changed by contextual developments in
actors and structures. These changes and their determi-
nants, then, deserve particular attention.
In addition, the interaction between the vertical and
horizontal dimensions of global agrifood governance needs
to be explored further as well as the interconnectedness
between public and private governance. Moreover, addi-
tional momentum may be gained from analyses conceptu-
alizing private agrifood governance institutions as
constitutive of actors (interests and identities) and not just
functional instruments (regulation). From this perspective,
the discursive nature and power of private agrifood gov-
ernance moves to the centre of attention. Finally, there is
urgent need to compare the food sector with other sectors,
of course, in order to compare and contrast developments
thereby putting the pieces of the puzzle together and cre-
ating a clearer picture of global governance as such.
On the political side, the necessary next steps are
becoming clear as well. Private agrifood governance needs
to improve its record on participation, transparency, and
accountability. In addition, it needs to integrate social and
broader environmental issues in its principles and stan-
dards. In its current form, private agrifood governance
fosters a widening of the gap in access to food as well as
food governance. These improvements can derive from the
private actors creating and implementing private agrifood
governance institutions or they can be ensured through the
embedding of these institutions in an adequate public
regulatory framework. Thus, pressure on public actors to
take responsibility and fulfill their role is just as necessary.
One area, which has to be of key concern for public
intervention in the global agrifood system, is the existing
level of horizontal and vertical capital concentration in the
food value chain. The oligopolies which have developed in
the last decades and continue to expand their market con-
trol, lead to high asymmetries in structural power, which,
in turn, provide an extraordinary amount of bargaining
power as well as direct access to resources for the trans-
national corporations sharing these oligopolies. It is highly
questionable, whether any kind of political intervention
would be able to balance these power asymmetries as long
as the oligopolies are allowed to exist. Small farmers will
never be able to organize as effectively and speak with as
unified a voice as a handful of transnational corporations.
In consequence, the most fundamental question to consider
by public regulation is that of market structure and
acceptable limits to corporate growth.
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